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This article begins with describing the decades-old 
struggle by South Africa’s most senior prosecutors 
to be independent of executive interference. 
Unsurprisingly, the independence of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) played a prominent role 
in the debates around the establishment of a new, 
unified prosecution service for a post-apartheid 
South Africa. This is followed by an analysis of the 
development and growth of the NPA, focusing on its 
performance and the impact political interference – 
and the politicisation of some of the NPA’s leadership 
– has had on the organisation and its operational 
effectiveness. The article is based on research the 
author has undertaken on the NPA for the last 15 
years,1 including interviews with a cross section of 
NPA staff in a number of provinces in 2012 – 2013.
Born into controversy
The establishment of the NPA was itself contentious.2 
From the beginning of negotiations in the early 1990s 
about South Africa’s future political dispensation, 
control over criminal prosecutions and, related, the 
relationship between a new prosecution service and 
the political executive were contested.3 It is necessary 
to provide some background to the debate, as 
the arguably ambiguous constitutional provisions 
dealing with the NPA would come back to haunt 
the organisation as it experienced, and, at times, 
succumbed to, political interference.4 
Since Union in 1910, South Africa’s prosecutors 
were, to varying degrees, subjected to executive 
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interference in their affairs.5 Between 1926 and 1992, 
successive ministers of justice effectively controlled 
the attorneys-general, the country’s most senior 
prosecutors, whose powers extended largely along 
provincial lines.6 
In 1992, the Attorney-General Act7 sought to ensure 
that attorneys-general functioned independently of 
the executive. In terms of the Act, the authority to 
institute prosecutions became the sole responsibility 
of the attorneys-general and their delegates, free 
of ministerial interference.8 Post-1994 the African 
National Congress (ANC), as ruling party, viewed 
the 1992 Act with suspicion. It regarded the Act 
as a political ploy by the outgoing National Party 
government to entrench the position of the attorneys-
general, who were representative of the old order.9 
The ANC successfully pushed for a constitutional 
provision to establish a national prosecuting authority 
for South Africa, whose head would be appointed by 
the president.10 The constitutionality of the provision 
was challenged by a number of provincial attorneys-
general at the time, on the grounds that it impinged 
on the separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary.11 The Constitutional Court 
rejected this objection, arguing that the prosecuting 
authority is not part of the judiciary, and that the 
appointment of its head by the president does not 
in itself contravene the doctrine of the separation of 
powers.12 
Fears about the NPA’s independence from political 
interference revolved around two related concerns, 
with the first being the power of the executive – that 
of the minister of justice in particular – to influence 
and interfere with the function of the country’s 
chief prosecutor, the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP).13  Second, the centralised and 
hierarchical nature of the NPA endowed the NDPP 
with considerable power over the provincial Directors 
of Public Prosecutions (DPPs) and, by implication, all 
prosecutors in the country.14 For example, the NDPP 
has the authority to intervene in the prosecution 
process when policy directives are not complied 
with,15 and to review a decision to prosecute or 
not prosecute, after ‘consulting’ the relevant DPPs 
(i.e. the NDPP can overrule his deputies, provided 
consultation has taken place).16 
In 1998, then president Nelson Mandela’s 
appointment of Bulelani Ngcuka as the NPA’s first 
head raised concerns among the General Council of 
the Bar and opposition parties that the NDPP would 
be a partisan political appointee.17 Ngcuka, relatively 
unknown prior to his appointment, had served as 
ANC Chief Whip in the National Council of Provinces, 
following earlier work on the ANC Constitutional 
Committee and with the United Democratic Front. 
Ngcuka was, however, well regarded across the 
political spectrum and considered a hard worker and 
consensus-builder.
Immediate challenges, new priorities
On assuming his post in mid-1998 – initially with no 
staff or even a national office – Ngcuka faced three 
fundamental challenges:18 winning the respect and 
allegiance of senior prosecutors, many of whom 
had been appointed during the apartheid era and 
who had opposed the creation of a centralised 
prosecution service; raising morale and productivity 
among junior prosecutors; and building public 
confidence in the new prosecuting authority.19 
Some of these challenges were acute. The NPA 
inherited a fragmented, provincially-based and poorly 
remunerated prosecution corps, with some offices 
close to collapse.20 For example, between 1994 
and 1997 some 630 prosecutors – approximately 
a third of the total number of prosecutors at the 
time – resigned countrywide.21 Between them they 
had the equivalent of more than 2 000 years of work 
experience as prosecutors, and their departure 
inevitably lowered the average experience level of 
prosecutors.22 
The establishment of the NPA coincided with a shift 
in priorities for the criminal justice system.23 From 
1994 through 1997, government leaders in the 
justice sector had focused on the transformation 
of the police and the criminal justice system more 
broadly. Their goal was to make the justice system 
more responsive to community concerns, more 
accountable and democratic, and more focused on 
some of the underlying drivers of crime, especially 
socio-economic deprivation.24 
By 1998, however, with concern about rising 
violent crime spreading to virtually all communities, 
7SA Crime QuArterly No. 50 • DeCemBer 2014
condemnation of the ineffectiveness of the criminal 
justice system was widespread. In response, the 
government adopted a more aggressive approach to 
combating crime through robust and visible policing, 
tougher bail laws, severe punishment of criminal 
offenders, and new enforcement tools to deal with 
organised crime.25 This resulted in a massive increase 
in arrests and cases of criminal investigations referred 
to court by the police for prosecutors’ attention.26 
The NPA responded to these challenges in a variety 
of ways.
Innovation and specialisation
The NPA’s enabling legislation provided the new 
prosecuting authority with a powerful capacity 
to combat crime in the form of Investigating 
Directorates.27 Headed by a senior prosecutor, 
Directorate staff were granted considerable 
investigative powers. Investigating Directorates 
were designed to be staffed by a core group of 
senior prosecutors and detectives, assisted, where 
necessary, by relevant specialists such as forensic 
accountants and intelligence personnel. Investigating 
Directorates were meant to enable prosecution-
driven investigations,28 where investigations 
are conducted under the close guidance and 
assistance of a senior prosecutor to ensure that 
evidence collected can be used effectively in court.29  
Traditionally, prosecutors and investigators in South 
Africa worked relatively independently of one another 
in different agencies.
The NPA quickly established three high-profile 
national Investigating Directorates: for organised 
crime, serious economic offences, and corruption.30 
In 2001, these were submerged into a newly created 
Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), commonly 
known as the ‘Scorpions’, focusing on a variety 
of national priority crimes and organised crime.31 
With a focus on high-profile cases, the Scorpions 
were almost immediately a public relations success. 
Moreover, the new directorate demonstrated the 
effectiveness of prosecution-driven investigations for 
successfully prosecuting complex crimes.32 
Within the first five years of the NPA’s existence 
a number of specialised units were established, 
permitting prosecutors to develop skills and long-
term strategies for combating particularly challenging 
and pernicious forms of crime.33 The first such unit, 
set up in 1999, was the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU),34  
using South Africa’s new forfeiture legislation to 
pursue the assets of persons involved in organised 
crime and the proceeds of such crime. Shortly 
thereafter the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit 
(SCCU)35 was established with the aim of reducing 
complex commercial crime and, together with the 
police, effectively investigating and prosecuting these 
crimes.
Also in 1999, the Sexual Offences and Community 
Affairs (SOCA) Unit36 was established with the 
objective of reducing levels of violence against 
women and children, and minimising the secondary 
victimisation that victims of sexual offences 
experience in their dealings with the criminal justice 
system. SOCA set up the first ‘one-stop’ Thuthuzela 
Care Centre for sexual offences victims in 2000.37 
Now numbering 35 around the country, the Care 
Centres use a multi-disciplinary approach, involving 
all the role players necessary for a successful sexual 
offences investigation and prosecution.38 This 
integrated model has received much international 
acclaim and is being replicated outside South 
Africa.39 
In 2003, the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit was 
set up to deal with, inter alia, international crimes 
contained in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, crimes against the state such as 
terrorism, and matters emanating from the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process.40 
The NPA also established a number of other units 
and programmes supporting its core prosecutorial 
function, including corporate services, an Integrity 
Management Unit, a research office, an Aspirant 
Prosecutors’ Programme, and an Office for Witness 
Protection.41 
A division of the NPA dedicated to managing 
the performance of prosecutors countrywide, 
the National Prosecuting Service (NPS), was 
also established.42 Through the NPS and a court 
management unit, the NPA initiated a strategic 
planning process and the design of a system 
of performance measurement. It introduced 
performance targets for individual prosecutors 
institute for security studies8
and provided enhanced training and a new level of 
managers (chief prosecutors) to help coordinate and 
assess the performance of prosecutors.
A further innovative development was the introduction 
of a ‘community prosecution’ model, which sought 
to generate a new range of responses to crime that 
moved beyond the traditional NPA role of processing 
and prosecuting cases.43 Instead of prosecuting 
cases in court, the community prosecutor’s mission 
was to reduce and prevent crime, and build 
relationships and collaborate with the community.44 
Consolidation and growth
During the early years of the NPA’s existence, 
Ngcuka and his senior team sought to create a 
national and unified prosecuting authority; in terms 
of both structure and management systems and the 
attitudes of its staff. This was no easy task. At the 
time of the NPA’s creation, the country’s (provincial) 
prosecution services were losing professional staff at 
an alarming rate because of, inter alia, poor pay and 
working conditions, many senior white prosecutors’ 
uncertainty about their future, and rapidly rising levels 
of recorded crime, which not only placed increased 
burdens on prosecutors but also undermined public 
confidence in the criminal justice system.
Partly because he was a political insider with an open 
channel to then president Thabo Mbeki, and partly 
because of the pressure the government experienced 
to combat crime, Ngcuka managed to accrue 
additional resources for the NPA, including salary 
increases for prosecutors.45 With increased funding, 
the NPA established new senior positions, expanding 
the number of career paths for prosecutors. 
Increased specialisation allowed experienced 
prosecutors to become experts in their fields.
The NPA also removed prosecutors in the lower 
courts from the de facto day-to-day administrative 
control of magistrates, contributing to an overall 
professionalisation of the prosecution service. A 
new and modern head office building, the rising 
prominence and success of the Scorpions, and 
regular nationwide meetings between senior 
prosecutors to discuss strategy and share good 
practices, all contributed to an improved image46 for 
the prosecuting authority and a growing esprit de 
corps for its prosecutors.47 
As one commentator noted: ‘In its first few years the 
NPA attracted talented lawyers who gave up private 
sector jobs to join this cool new outfit. Along with 
the taxman, the NPA was easily the most attractive 
government agency to work for.’48 
Performance
The NPA’s performance should be interpreted in 
the context of an increase in resources, especially 
in the number of prosecutorial staff. Moreover, 
the NPA added an additional layer of countrywide 
supervision to the prosecutorial function, improved 
and institutionalised training for prosecutors, and 
enhanced its ability to measure the performance and 
output of prosecutors. Given these positive changes, 
it is striking that the data discussed below do not 
show more sustained and marked improvements in 
the NPA’s performance.
During the first few years of its existence, the NPA 
had to deal with a massive increase in the number of 
cases referred to court by the police – from 524 000 
in 1998 to over a million in 2002 (Figure 1).49 
Figure 1: case processing trends, 1996 – 2012/13
Source: NPA and SAPS annual reports50
Between 1999 and 2002, the number of 
prosecuted cases increased by 62%. It is probably 
no coincidence that the upward swing in the 
number of prosecuted cases began shortly after 
the establishment of the NPA. The NPA employed 
additional prosecutors shortly after its establishment, 
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and succeeded in increasing the number of trial 
hours in court.51 The introduction of Saturday52 and 
additional courts in 2001 also contributed to the 
increase in the number of finalised cases.53 
The gradual downward trend in the number of 
prosecutions after 2002 can be attributed to an 
increase in the use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms by the NPA and a decline in the number 
of cases referred to court. While a negligible number 
of cases had been resolved through alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms in 1998, by 2012/13 
these had increased to over 143 000.54 
The overall conviction rate, calculated as the 
number of cases convicted as a proportion of 
cases prosecuted, has improved since 1998 (Figure 
2).55 This is, however, an ambiguous performance 
indicator. Generally the NPA prosecutes cases only 
when its prosecutors believe they have a reasonable 
prospect of obtaining a conviction. By interpreting 
these criteria to prosecute more restrictively – by 
withdrawing borderline cases, for example – 
prosecutors are able to improve their chances 
of obtaining a conviction without any requisite 
improvement in the skills they devoted thereto.
The steady increase in the number of cases 
withdrawn by the prosecution service was reversed 
after 2002.56 Nonetheless, the number of cases 
referred to court and subsequently withdrawn by the 
NPA remains high, typically in the region of 300 000 
per year in the decade after 2003.57 
Figure 2: Conviction rate, 1996 – 2012/13
Source: NPA and Department of Justice annual reports58
The NPA’s achievements have been more 
pronounced in the output of its specialised units. 
The DSO, the AFU, the SCCU and the SOCA Unit 
have, for example, succeeded in maintaining high 
performance rates in prosecuting complex and 
serious crimes and, in the case of the AFU, seizing 
the proceeds of organised crime.59 
As discussed in the next section, a very small 
subset of the NPA’s successes – investigating and 
prosecuting high-profile politicians – has resulted 
in the erosion of its independence. Thus, the NPA’s 
emblematic crime-fighting tool, the DSO, was 
disbanded after a resolution to this effect was passed 
at the ANC’s annual conference in 200760 (see SACQ 
24, June 2008). 
Politicisation of the NPA
In 2000, the DSO began a corruption investigation 
into a multi-billion rand arms procurement package 
concluded by the South African government in 1999. 
The primary suspect in the NPA’s investigation was 
Schabir Shaik, a businessman and financial advisor 
to then deputy president Jacob Zuma.61 His brother, 
Chippy Shaik, was in charge of arms acquisitions at 
the Department of Defence, which allowed Schabir 
Shaik to bid on a lucrative contract to supply 
Corvettes to the South African Navy.62 It subsequently 
transpired that Schabir Shaik was believed to have 
had a corrupt relationship with Zuma, and that the 
latter was also a suspect in the investigation.63 In 
August 2003, Ngcuka announced that despite the 
existence of a prima facie case against the deputy 
president, the NPA would not prosecute him.64 This 
went against the advice given to Ngcuka by his team 
of senior arms deal prosecutors.65  
Zuma supporters interpreted Ngcuka’s 
announcement as part of a manoeuvre to taint 
Zuma’s reputation: namely, that Ngcuka’s decision 
suggested that Zuma was likely guilty of a crime but 
that the NPA lacked the necessary evidence to prove 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as would be required 
in a trial. In the ensuing fallout, Ngcuka was accused 
of being an apartheid-era spy but was cleared by 
a commission of inquiry instituted by Mbeki.66 In 
mid-2004, Ngcuka announced his decision to resign, 
citing personal reasons.67 It is likely, however, that the 
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debacle around Ngcuka’s decision not to prosecute 
Zuma, a critical report by the Public Protector on that 
decision, and the spying allegations all contributed to 
Ngcuka’s decision.68 
The above developments occurred in the context of a 
power struggle between two factions within the ANC, 
aligned behind Mbeki on the one side and Zuma on 
the other.
In the interim, the case against Schabir Shaik had 
gone ahead. Upon Schabir Shaik’s conviction in 
mid-2005, Mbeki announced that Zuma would be 
relieved of his government duties because of the 
latter’s relationship with Shaik, as found in the court 
judgement.69 
This context is important as it provides the first 
indication that the NPA could be misused in an intra-
party political power struggle in the ANC – fissures 
that were to affect and divide the NPA profoundly in 
the years thereafter.70 
In 2005, Vusi Pikoli succeeded Ngcuka as NDPP.71  
Under Pikoli’s leadership, emboldened by the Schabir 
Shaik conviction, the NPA charged Zuma with 
various counts of racketeering, money laundering, 
corruption and fraud.72 A conviction and sentence of 
imprisonment exceeding one year – highly likely upon 
conviction on such serious charges – would have 
rendered Zuma ineligible for election to Parliament 
and thereby to serve as the country’s president. This 
was a direct threat to Zuma’s ambitions, as he had 
been elected as head of the ANC in late 2007.
Also under Pikoli’s leadership, the NPA determined 
to prosecute the then national commissioner of 
police, Jackie Selebi, a perceived ally of Mbeki, on 
corruption charges.73 Shortly after the existence of a 
warrant for the arrest of Selebi became known, Mbeki 
suspended Pikoli on the basis of an ‘irretrievable 
breakdown’ in the relationship between Pikoli and 
the justice minister.74 While a commission of inquiry 
subsequently found that most of the allegations 
against Pikoli were unfounded, Parliament endorsed 
Pikoli’s suspension.75 Pikoli’s dismissal had a chilling 
effect on the NPA and was a deeply demoralising 
experience for prosecutors who saw in him a 
disciplined and principled leader.76 
The political meddling in the affairs of the NPA by 
the country’s executive, and the impact this had on 
the organisation, is a matter of public record. The 
various machinations are sufficiently numerous and 
complex to fill a book.77 Space does not permit a 
detailed exposition here; suffice to make the following 
abbreviated points:
•	 Ngcuka	was	NDPP	for	six	years	(the	law	provides	
for a 10-year tenure for an NDPP).78 After his 
departure, the NPA entered a period of instability, 
infighting and public controversy, all of which 
continue to this day. Since August 2004, the 
NPA has had six different NDPPs (of which three 
served in an acting capacity)79 – an average of 
less than two years per NDPP or acting NDPP. 
This led to numerous changes in the strategy and 
organisational priorities of the NPA.
•	Within	the	NPA’s	senior	leadership,	pro-Mbeki	
and pro-Zuma factions developed, affecting staff 
morale and unduly influencing senior appointments 
and promotions.80 Often a form of institutional 
stalemate ensued with numerous senior positions 
filled by ‘acting’ appointees who lacked the security 
permanent appointment would provide. This state 
of affairs has had an arguably debilitating effect on 
the NPA’s organisational effectiveness, and diverted 
institutional energy to internecine conflicts at the 
expense of focusing on the organisation’s mission.
•	 As	a	consequence	of,	inter	alia,	the	DSO’s	
success in investigating, among others, senior 
MPs implicated in the ‘Travelgate’ scandal,81  and 
politicians involved in the arms deal, notably Zuma 
and Selebi, the enthusiasm the ruling party’s 
members of Parliament and the executive held 
for the DSO ‘waned substantially’.82 This resulted 
in the disbandment of the DSO and the loss of a 
significant crime-fighting tool in the NPA’s armoury.
•	On	application	of	the	opposition	Democratic	
Alliance, the Constitutional Court found that Menzi 
Simelane, who was appointed as NDPP in late 
2009 by President Zuma, was not a fit and proper 
person to be NDPP, thus effectively overturning 
the President’s appointment.83 For the head of a 
relatively young organisation (the NPA had been 
in existence for 13 years at the time Simelane’s 
appointment was set aside by the courts) to 
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be branded unsuitable to his position invariably 
undermined public confidence in the organisation 
and underscored the political nature of the NDPP’s 
appointment.
•	 Badly	conceptualised	and	politically	motivated	
decisions by the NPA have resulted in the 
courts reviewing NPA decisions to discontinue 
prosecutions in a select number of high-profile 
cases.84 If this becomes a trend, it can result in 
the NPA being bogged down in costly and time-
consuming litigation in the years ahead, being 
asked to justify why it declined to prosecute in 
specific cases. This is not to question the courts’ 
authority to review, under certain circumstances, 
prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute, but it 
is an indictment of the NPA that its traditionally 
wide-ranging discretion to decline to prosecute is 
coming under increasing judicial scrutiny.
The disappointing aspects of the NPA’s performance 
are especially glaring in the context of the growth 
in the number of prosecutorial staff over the past 
decade, and better pay and working conditions. It is 
possible that areas of poor performance have been 
exacerbated by the political and politicised crises the 
NPA has been embroiled in for the greater part of its 
existence.
Shortly after the Supreme Court of Appeal set 
aside Simelane’s appointment as NDPP for being 
‘inconsistent with the constitution and invalid’,85 and 
the NPA’s withdrawal of corruption and fraud charges 
against Richard Mdluli, head of crime intelligence in 
the police (a decision which the courts subsequently 
set aside),86 one commentator wrote in early 2012:
The NPA is a flicker of its old self, plagued 
by internal power battles, witch-hunts and 
pungent odours of political influence. Good 
prosecutors are leaving in droves, I am told, 
and those who stay keep their mouths shut 
and follow orders.87 
Conclusion
After its establishment in 1998, the NPA rapidly drew 
together the provincial attorneys-general’s offices 
into one national organisation. In short order, the new 
organisation set up the DSO with its multi-disciplinary, 
prosecution-driven approach to investigations, and 
established specialised units in the office of the 
NDPP. It also created new positions to enhance the 
career choices of prosecutors, professionalised the 
management of the NPA’s growing staff, and devoted 
time and effort to improving the NPA’s image among 
the public through innovative approaches such as 
‘community prosecution’ and public outreach efforts.
The positive changes have had the most measurable 
impact on the performance of the NPA’s specialised 
units. The NPA’s performance at the lower or 
magistrate’s court level, where the vast majority 
of all prosecutions occur and where most public 
interactions with the prosecution service take place, 
are more mixed.
Time will tell whether the NPA is able to extract itself 
from its present malaise. It has the resources and 
infrastructure, and many dedicated prosecutors 
to do so. To fulfil its constitutional mandate to 
prosecute ‘without fear, favour or prejudice’, a 
principled and dedicated core of senior NPA leaders 
is indispensable. The NPA will need leaders who are 
committed to upholding the Constitution and, by 
implication, the rule of law.
As gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, 
prosecutors are the system’s most powerful 
officials. Prosecutors decide whether criminal 
charges should be brought and what those charges 
should be. In South Africa, prosecutors exercise 
considerable discretion in making those crucial 
decisions. Politicians the world over, particularly 
those in powerful executive positions, will always 
be tempted to interfere in prosecutorial decisions, 
especially where they are the subject of investigations 
and possible prosecution. Whether blatant political 
interference or subtle pressure – and the NPA has 
suffered plenty of both – the best line of defence is 
prosecutors themselves, who need to be beyond 
reproach. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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